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COMMENT
ACQUISTA v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY: CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES,
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND PROTECTING
THE INSURED AND THE INSURER
JOHN U. BAUCOt
INTRODUCTION
When a contract is breached, the modern approach of
contract law is to award money damages to the nonbreaching
party commensurate with that party's expectation interest-the
amount that will place the nonbreaching party in a position
equal to the one it would have achieved had the breaching party
fulfilled its contractual obligations.' When an insurance
company breaches an insurance contract by refusing in bad faith
to pay the amount due the policyholder, courts traditionally have
limited damage awards to the amount of the policy.2 A number
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., May
1991, New York University.
1 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that the
"basic principle for the measurement of... the injured party's expectation... [is to
compensate the insured party in the] amount that will put [the injured party] in as
good a position as [it] would have been in had the contract been performed"); see
also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14.4 (4th
ed. 1998) (stating that "[flor breach of contract, the law of damages seeks to place
the aggrieved party in the same economic position the aggrieved party would have
attained if the contract had been performed"); Alan 0. Sykes, "Bad Faith" Breach of
Contract by First-Party Insurers, 25(2) J. LEGAL STUDIES 405, 408-09 (1996) ("[I]t
has long been said that the usual objective of contract damages is to place the
promisee in the same position that the promisee would have enjoyed had the
contract been performed.").
2 See Sykes, supra note 1, at 408 (stating that courts in the past have refused to
award policyholders damages in excess of the amount specified in policy); see also
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of jurisdictions and commentators have concluded, however, that
when an insured proves a bad faith breach on the part of an
insurance company, damage awards limited to the amount of the
policy may be insufficient to satisfy the insured's expectation. 3
Numerous state high courts have responded by recognizing a tort
cause of action that policyholders may bring against insurers
who breach their contracts in bad faith. This tort action allows
the aggrieved party to recover punitive damages. 4 Alternatively,
a handful of states have rejected the tort action in favor of an
expanded contract remedy that allows insured parties to recover
consequential damages beyond the amount specified in the
policy.5 Indeed, states that continue to limit damages to the
policy amount in insurer bad faith cases are in the minority.
Recently, in Acquista v. New York Life Insurance Co., the First
Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York held that damages awarded to a policyholder for an
insurance company's bad faith breach need not be limited to the
Phyllis Savage, Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to
Honor First Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
164, 167 (1976-1977) (stating that damage awards to policyholders traditionally do
not exceed the policy amount because (1) such additional damages are not
foreseeable by the insurance company and (2) "in a suit for money due under a
contract, recovery is normally limited to the debt plus interest").
3 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) (stating that
"[niothing inherent in the contract law approach" requires the courts to limit
damages recoverable for an insurance company's bad faith breach to the amount of
the policy); Sykes, supra note 1, at 409 (stating that an award of money damages "at
the conclusion of litigation, equal to what the insurer should have paid in the first
place, fails to achieve this goal [of satisfying the insured's contractual expectation]");
Savage, supra note 2, at 166, 168 (stating that several jurisdictions have
endeavored to protect policyholders from insurance companies by "permitting first
party insurance claimants to recover amounts in excess of policy limits plus
interest" because traditional legal concepts have been inadequate to provide such
protection).
4 The Acquista court listed twenty-five states that have judicially adopted the
first-party bad faith tort: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Acquista v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d 272, 276-77 (1st Dep't. 2001). Two states, Florida and
Pennsylvania, have enacted statutes accomplishing the same. See id. at 277 n.1; see
also Dominick C. Capozzola, Note, First-Party Bad Faith: The Search for a Uniform
Standard of Culpability, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 181, 181-82 (2000) (stating that since
1973 at least twenty-six states have adopted the first-party bad faith tort).
5 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 277 (listing six states-Delaware, Maine, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Utah, and West Virginia-that allow an insured to recover
foreseeable money damages in excess of the amount of the policy).
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amount due under the policy but may include consequential
damages extending beyond the policy limit when such damages
are foreseeable. 6
In Acquista, the plaintiff, Angelo Acquista, was a physician
who specialized in internal and pulmonary medicine.7
Numerous medical tests revealed that he possessed a blood
disorder and, possibly, myelodysplasia, an ailment that could
progress into leukemia.8  His symptoms included fatigue,
headaches, and muscle and joint pain.9 Prior to his illness, the
plaintiff purchased three disability insurance policies offered by
the defendant, New York Life Insurance Company, through the
defendant agents Jenny Kho and Helen Kho.1° The defendant
insurance company rejected the plaintiffs claims for disability
benefits "on the ground that he [could] still perform some of the
'substantial and material duties' of his regular job or jobs and
therefore [was] not 'totally disabled.' "11 The plaintiff sued for
breach of contract, bad faith, unfair practices, fraud, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 12 The bad faith claim was predicated on allegations
that the insurer engaged in dilatory tactics to avoid paying the
benefits. 13 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss with respect to all claims but one, which was based on a
policy provision for residual and partial disability benefits. 14 The
6 See id. at 278-79.
7 Id. at 273.
8 Id.
9Id.
10 Id. Two of the policies defined "total disability" as the inability of the insured
to perform "the substantial and material duties" required of his position. Id.
(quoting policies). The third policy defined "total disability" as the inability to
perform "any of [those] substantial and material duties." Id. at 274 (quoting policy).
11 Id. at 273.
12 Id.
13 See id. at 275. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant "would make multiple
requests for additional documentation, upon receipt of which further documents
would be demanded, after which plaintiffs claims file would then be transferred to a
new examiner, who in turn would make more requests." Id. Additionally, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant "waited more than two years to request or
schedule an independent medical examination." Id. The plaintiff also alleged that
the defendant "wrongfully and unjustifiably refused to accept" his reasonable offer
of settlement. Id. at 280 (Andrias, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, enumerated
facts indicating that, according to the dissent, the plaintiff himself contributed to
the delays, thus suggesting that that the bad faith claim may have been
manufactured. Id. at 282 (Andrias, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 274.
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appellate division modified the lower court's decision by
reinstating the breach of contract, bad faith, and unfair practices
claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. 15
In restoring the bad faith claim, Justice Saxe, writing for the
majority, declined to adopt the tort cause of action for first-party
breach by an insurance company.16  The court reasoned,
however, that simply awarding a policyholder the face value of
the policy plus interest due at the conclusion of trial may not
accomplish the recognized objective of modern damages
schemes-to place the aggrieved party in as good of a position in
which he would have been had the insurer performed the
contract in good faith. 17 The court stated that the traditional
view of limiting damages to the policy amount relies on the false
assumption that a plaintiff has access to funds to pay for the loss
caused by the event against which the plaintiff was insured.'8
The plaintiff, in fact, could be damaged additionally if he does
not have the funds to pay that which the insurer should have
paid. 19 The traditional view, the court reasoned, also fails to
consider the emotional distress or further physical injury that
may occur during protracted litigation when the plaintiff suffers
from serious medical ailments. 20 Critical to the court's inquiry
was the contention that insurance companies have little
15 Id. at 279-80.
16 See id. at 278. The court believed that adopting the tort would effect too great
a change in New York law in light of two New York Court of Appeals decisions
rejecting the tort. Id. at 275-76 (citing New York Univ. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 662
N.E.2d 763 (N.Y. 1995), and Rocanova v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S.,
634 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 1994)). The court also explained that the relationship between
an insurer and insured is contractual rather than fiduciary, thus precluding the
imposition of a tort remedy. Id. at 278 (quoting Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d
795, 800 (Utah 1985)).
17 See id. at 276 (citing CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, at § 14.4).
18 See id.; see also Savage, supra note 2, at 169 (stating that one rationale for
the traditional view is that "money is always available at approximately the legal
rate of interest" but that this view is incorrect because "it is highly unlikely that a
claimant who has recently suffered economic disaster would be able to obtain a loan
at all").
19 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 276; see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701
P.2d at 802 (stating that when an insured does not have access to funds and an
insurer refuses to pay, "catastrophic consequences" could result, including, for
example, loss of the insured's home or business).
20 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 276; see also Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 (stating
that inasmuch as it is generally recognized that insurance is purchased to secure
"peace of mind," damages for emotional distress might be provable "in unusual
cases").
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incentive to settle claims in good faith if they are held liable for
the policy amount-they have nothing to lose and much to gain
in delaying payment to insureds. 21  Conscious of all these
concerns, the court concluded that foreseeable consequential
damages exceeding the policy limits, including damages for
emotional distress and inconvenience, may be awarded to a
plaintiff who has proved a bad faith breach on the part of his
insurer.22
The majority stated that it would adopt the reasoning of the
Utah Supreme Court case Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange23
in support of its holding.24  The Beck court's rationale
encompassed several arguments. First, the relationship between
an insurance company and a policyholder is essentially
"contractual rather than fiduciary."25 The absence of a fiduciary
obligation between the parties renders the implementation of a
tort action theoretically unsound.26 Second, parties to a contract
must perform their countervailing obligations in good faith.27
Third, an insurance company easily may effect an outcome
favorable to its own interests by avoiding or delaying payment
because of the unequal bargaining power between the parties.28
The problem of insurance companies engaging in these tactics
has become pervasive. 29 As a matter of policy, therefore, an
expanded contract remedy would provide a necessary incentive
for insurers to deal in good faith.30  Fourth, contract law
recognizes a consequential damages remedy, which may allow
21 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 276 ("[Ilf statutory interest is lower than that
which the insurer can earn on the sums payable, the insurer has a financial
incentive to decline to cover or pay on a claim.") (citing Savage, supra note 2, at
167); see also Beck, 701 P.2d at 801 (stating that the court, in adopting the expanded
contract remedies, is persuaded by the "principle reason" other jurisdictions have
adopted the tort approach, which is to eliminate the incentive for insurance
companies to breach their contracts in bad faith).
22 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 278-79.
23 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
24 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 278 ("[11n order to ensure the availability of an
appropriate and sufficient remedy, we adopt the reasoning of the Beck court .. ")
25 Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 278 (quoting Beck v. Farmers Ins., 704 P.2d at
800).
28 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800.
27 See id. at 801.
28 See id. at 798; see also Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
29 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
30 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 799; see also Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
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recovery of an award beyond the stipulated contract amount.31
Such consequential damages should be permitted in the case of
an insurer's bad faith breach because such breach could cause
injury to policyholders in amounts above those set in the
policies.32 Finally, insofar as insurance contracts are executed to
provide and secure "peace of mind" for the insured, damages for
emotional distress may be foreseeable and properly awarded.33
The Aquista dissent, written by Justice Andrias, argued for
dismissal of the bad faith claim. A bad faith claim, according to
the dissent, should not be adopted in New York because the use
of dilatory tactics in settling a claim gives rise to a private
dispute that only affects the parties to the contract, and not the
general public.34 The majority, however, rejected this argument
by stating that the problem of insurer bad faith breach has
become "widespread enough to prompt most states to respond
with some sort of remedy for aggrieved policyholders."35 To
characterize these claims, therefore, as " 'unique to these
parties'... is to utterly ignore this fact."36 The dissent further
contended that, in any event, the plaintiff had not alleged facts
that established a bad faith case.37 Justice Andrias argued that
the breach of the duty of good faith is governed by a "gross
disregard" standard, which the plaintiff had failed to satisfy.38
31 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 801 ("[T]here is no reason to limit damages recoverable
for breach of a duty to investigate, bargain, and settle claims in good faith to the
amount specified in the insurance policy ... although the policy limits define the
amount for which the insurer may be held responsible in performing the contract,
they do not define the amount for which it may be liable upon a breach.").
32 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 ("In an action for breach of a duty to bargain in
good faith, a broad range of recoverable damages is conceivable, particularly given
the unique nature and purpose of an insurance contract."); see also Acquista, 730
N.Y.S.2d at 276 ("[Ain award, at the conclusion of litigation, of money damages
equal to what the insurer should have paid in the first place, may not.., place the
plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the contract been performed.").
33 Beck, 701 P.2d at 802; see also Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 277-78.
34 Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 280 (Andrias, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. Univ. v.
Cont'l Ins. Co., 662 N.E.2d 763, 771 (N.Y. 1995)).
35 Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 278.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 280-81 (Andrias, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 281 (Andrias, J., dissenting) ("[A] bad-faith plaintiff must establish
that the defendant insurer engaged in a pattern of behavior evincing a conscious or
knowing indifference to the probability that an insured would be held personally
accountable for a large judgment if a settlement offer within policy limits were not
accepted." (citing Pavia v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27-28
(1993))). The dissent however, failed to acknowledge that the gross disregard
[Vol.76:201
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The plaintiff even failed to allege facts, the dissent contended,
that would make out a bad faith claim under the standard
adopted by the majority.39 The dissent, therefore, would have
affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs bad faith claim. The
majority, on the other hand, concluded that dismissal pursuant
to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211 based on the defendant's documentary
evidence was inappropriate as a matter of procedure. 40
It is submitted that the Acquista court was correct to expand
damage awards to include consequential damages, including
damages for emotional distress, when an insurer commits a bad
faith breach of a policy. The court, however, in focusing on the
insured, did not consider the repercussions of its decision on
insurance companies. This Comment contends that because
insurance companies provide important benefits to policyholders,
expanded awards could have a detrimental effect on society. It is
submitted that, while an award of consequential damages would
be appropriate in certain cases, the contours of such an award
should be more sharply defined than they were in Acquista.
This Comment will first analyze the law of New York State
with respect to consequential damages and the bad faith breach
cause of action. It will be argued that bad faith breach is a valid
contract action, but that consequential damages must be limited
by giving full force to the concept of "foreseeability" within the
meaning of Hadley v. Baxendale principles. Finally, this
Comment will urge that damages for emotional distress should
be granted only in certain limited situations.
standard in Pavia applied to a third-party claim, whereas, here, the plaintiff's claim
was a first-party bad faith claim. See infra note 92-95 and accompanying text.
39 See id. at 282 (Andrias, J., dissenting) (stating that the plaintiff failed to
allege that" the insurer failed to carry out an investigation, evaluate the feasibility
of settlement [of the plaintiffs claim]... or to offer the policy limits... after the
weaknesses of [the claim were] clearly and fully assessed").
40 See id. at 274. The court felt compelled to accept the plaintiffs factual
allegations as true, as required under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211. Id. The documentary
evidence submitted by the defendant did not "flatly disprove" the plaintiffs
contentions. Id. The defendants, therefore, could not prevail on their motion to
dismiss unless its evidence "conclusively establish[ed], as a matter of law, that
contrary to plaintiffs allegations, he was still able to perform 'the substantial and
material duties' of his regular job or jobs as they existed before he became ill." Id. at
275 (emphasis in original).
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I. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
A. Hadley v. Baxendale in New York
Because insurance policies traditionally have been regarded
as contracts to pay money, damages for breach of a policy have
been limited generally to the amount of the policy plus interest.41
As stated above, limiting damages to the amount of the policy
may be insufficient to place the nonbreaching policyholder in the
position in which it would have been if the insurance company
had not breached the contract.42 Since the seminal case of
Hadley v. Baxendale;43 decided in 1854, the common law has
recognized that damages for a loss that would not naturally flow
from a breach is recoverable as consequential damages only
when such a loss was reasonably contemplated by the parties at
the time'they entered into the contract. 44 Modern courts express
the Hadley v. Baxendale test in terms of "foreseeability"; they
allow damages only insofar as the possibility of the loss for which
they are sought was foreseeable by the contracting parties at
time of contracting. 45 In order to meet the requirement of
foreseeability, it is sufficient that the breaching party had been
aware of the facts that rendered the loss foreseeable. 46
New York State allows the award of consequential damages
for breach of contract if the requirement set forth in Hadley v.
Baxendale is satisfied.47 When determining whether a particular
41 See id. 276 (citing Savage, supra note 2, at 167).
42 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
43 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
44 See id. 151 (explaining that damages are recoverable "such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it"). This is the
second, more significant, principle espoused in Hadley v. Baxendale; see also
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, at § 14.5; FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 2.14.
The first principle given in Hadley is a restatement of the general rule that a
nonbreaching party may recover damages "as may fairly and reasonably be
considered [as] arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself." See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; see also CALAMARI
& PERILLO, supra note 1, at § 14.5; FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.14.
45 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.14; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 1, at § 14.5.
46 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.14; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 1, at § 14.5.
47 See Kenford Co., Inc. v. Erie, 537 N.E.2d 176, 178 (N.Y. 1989) (stating that in
order for a nonbreaching party to receive damages for loss beyond that which
"'naturally and directly [flow from the breach], i.e., in the ordinary course of
[Vol.76:201
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loss was foreseeable, meaning it was within the contemplation of
the parties, the courts consider such factors as the nature and
purpose of the contract and the surrounding circumstances as
understood by the parties.48 Additionally, the courts determine
whether the defendant reasonably should have recognized that
such consequential loss could have occurred. 49  New York,
however, has declined to apply these principles to first-party
breaches of insurance policies and has-limited recovery for those
breaches to the amount- of the policy on the ground that there
could be no damages accruing in excess of the policy 5 Over the
past decade, however, New York's appellate division has refused
to award consequential damages for an insurer's bad faith
breach, not because such a breach could not cause damages in
excess of the policy, but on the ground that the excess damages
were not foreseeable or were too remote. 51 It is submitted that
New York courts would be willing to grant consequential
damages for first-party bad faith breaches of insurance polices
under the Hadley v. Baxendale standard if the loss was found to
things .... such unusual or extraordinary damages must have been brought within
the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of the breach at the time of
or prior to contracting'" (quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 119 N.E. 76, 77 (N.Y. 1918))).
48 See id. at 179 ("In determining the reasonable contemplation of the parties,
the nature, purpose and particular circumstances of the contract known by the
parties should be considered." (citing Mortimer v. Otto, 99 N.E. 189, 190 (N.Y.
1912))).
49 See id. (stating that the courts should consider" 'what liability the defendant
fairly may be supposed to have assumed consciously, or to have warranted the
plaintiff reasonably to suppose that it assumed, when the contract was made'
(quoting Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903))).
50 See Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 401 N.E.2d 171, 171-72 (N.Y. 1979)
(stating that an insured may not recover damages in excess of the policy "where the
insurer has terminated disability benefits allegedly payable to the insured, for there
is no possibility of the insured being cast in damages which exceed policy limits by
reason of the insurer's conduct"); see also LTS Contractors, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co.,
472 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (4th Dept. 1984) (refusing to award consequential damages to
the plaintiff for the insurer's failure to pay the "plaintiffs actual damages" on the
ground that "such consequential damages [did not arise] from defendant's breach").
51 See Sweazey v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 571 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132 (3d Dep't. 1991)
(stating that the plaintiffs claim for consequential damages should have been
dismissed "in the absence of plaintiffs showing that such damages were foreseeable
and within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made"); see
also Harriman v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 568 N.Y.S.2d 820, 820 (2d
Dep't. 1991) (stating that the plaintiff could not recover consequential damages
against her insurer because the claims were "speculative, remote, and could not
have been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the execution of
[the] insurance contract").
.209
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have been foreseeable.
B. Justification for Applying Hadley v. Baxendale Principles to
Insurance Policies
Necessity mandates that New York allow recovery of
consequential damages for an insurer's bad faith breach of an
insurance policy. Although some commentators argue that
insurance contracts are no different from other commercial
contracts, thus militating against special treatment by the
courts, 52 this Comment asserts that there are factors inherent in
insurance policies and in the dealings between the parties that
warrant the expanded contract remedy. Courts and
commentators widely recognize that insurance companies
engage in dilatory tactics to elude valid claims in most, if not all,
jurisdictions.53 Unlike many other commercial contracts-where
the tender of money occurs simultaneously with or closely
follows the tender of goods to be received, or does not become due
until a specified service is performed-with insurance contracts,
the insured has been paying the countervailing party
consistently over a period of time. By engaging in dilatory
tactics, an insurance company can retain the money already paid
to it. At best, the company will never have to pay benefits
specified by the policy; at worst, it will defer payment of these
benefits.54 In most cases, a policyholder attempting to recover on
the policy is in a very difficult position because of his/her greatly
inferior bargaining position.55 The insured, who generally has
significant financial concerns, may be forced to accept an
inadequate settlement or may not be in a position to litigate the
52 See Sykes, supra note 1, at 406.
53 See Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278 (1st Dep't.
2001) ("The problem of dilatory tactics by insurance companies seeking to delay and
avoid payment of proper claims has apparently become widespread enough to
prompt most states to respond with some sort of remedy for aggrieved
policyholders."); see also Savage, supra note 2, at 164 ("The cases cited herein
indicate that wrongful refusal to pay claims occurs with enough frequency that
adequate legal recourse should be available to insureds in order to prevent this
practice.").
54 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
55 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 1985) ("An insured
who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a marked disadvantage when
bargaining with an insurer over payment for that loss."); see also Savage, supra note
2, at 169 ("ITihe .parties to an insurance policy generally do not have equal
bargaining power.").
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issue against the insurer. 56 It is submitted, therefore, that
courts must provide an incentive to the insurance companies in
the form of consequential damages to encourage settlement of
meritorious claims in good faith.
The assumption that a policyholder will have access to funds
to pay what the insurer refuses to pay is unfounded.57 In fact,
the aggrieved party may indeed suffer losses that exceed the
policy amount. Such losses could include litigation costs, losses
due to bankruptcy, foreclosure of mortgaged property, interest
debt on money borrowed from a lending institution, interest lost
on money used to pay the amount the insurer did not pay, and
penalties imposed for early withdrawal of a retirement plan or
CD.58 If courts are to give effect to the recognized goal of
contract damages-to place the nonbreaching party in as good a
position as it would have achieved had the contract been
performed-they must consider these extra-policy losses as
possible consequential damages.
C. Limitations on Consequential Damages
Insurance is a significant component of our business,
personal, and social lives upon which most of us have come to
depend and rely.59 It is of great import, then, that excessive
damage awards do not unduly burden insurance companies. It is
submitted that strict adherence to Hadley v. Baxendale
principles would serve to protect both the honest insurer and any
maltreated insured. Furthermore, if New York were to adopt the
expanded contract remedy, insurance companies would not be
subject to damage awards in excess of the policy amount unless a
plaintiff proved bad faith on the part of the defendant insurer.
The Acquista court concluded that the plaintiffs "allegations
may be employed to interpose a claim for consequential damages
beyond the limits of the policy for the claimed breach of
56 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 798; see also Savage, supra note 2, at 169.
57 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 276; Savage, supra note 2, at 169.
58 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 802 (stating that when an insured does not have access
to funds to cover the insured loss after an insurer fails to settle a claim in good
faith, losses exceeding the policy amount could include loss of a home or business
due to bankruptcy and losses for emotional distress); see also Sykes, supra note 1, at
409 (stating that an insured's consequential damages could include costs of
litigation, repairs to a business, purchase of additional medical services, and
emotional distress).
59 See Savage, supra note 2, at 164.
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contract." 60 The court, however, did not discuss whether the
foreseeability requirement should be construed broadly or
narrowly. The court cited decisions from six jurisdictions that
have adopted the expanded contract damages rationale, but
those courts were not consistent in their treatment of
foreseeability. 61 It is submitted that narrow effect be given to
the concept of "foreseeability" within the context of awarding
consequential damages for first-party bad faith breaches by an
insurer. Although some commentators contend that this
approach would severely limit a plaintiffs ability to recover
consequential damages for numerous kinds of losses,62 such a
limitation is necessary to strike the appropriate balance between
what this Comment perceives to be the dual aims of the remedy:
(1) to protect the insured from the effects of an insurer's bad
faith breach by providing an incentive for insurers to settle
claims in good faith and (2) to protect the insurer, as well as the
existing insurance scheme, from the burdens of unforeseen and
remote damages and opportunistic litigation. In addition,
policyholders may be encouraged to disclose specific information
regarding finances, mortgaged property, and business concerns.
Such disclosure may not only provide the basis for a possible bad
faith action in the future, but also encourage the insurance
company to treat seriously its obligation to deal in good faith. Of
course, an insurer may charge a higher premium if it is to be
subject to greater risk. A policyholder, however, could avoid the
higher premium by not disclosing his or her own particular
circumstances, thus preserving the lower premium by foregoing
the higher likelihood of receiving consequential damages in a
bad faith action. It is submitted, therefore, that courts should
allow an award of consequential damages for the bad faith
breach of an insurer for losses that were foreseeable with
particularity at the time the parties entered into the contract.
Simply put, the courts should determine whether the specific
loss suffered by the aggrieved party was contemplated by the
parties, and not whether a general loss was foreseeable. In
60 Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 279,
61 See id. at 277 (citing decisions from Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Utah, and West Virginia).
62 See Savage, supra note 2, at 167 ("[Tlhe specific consequences of the insurer's
breach, such as loss of a home because of inability to meet mortgage obligations, are
not necessarily foreseeable. Thus, under the strict construction of the Hadley v.
Baxendale rule, consequential damages for such losses are unavailable.").
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determining whether this foreseeability with particularity test is
satisfied, courts should thoroughly examine the circumstances,
correspondence, and discussions between the parties.
For example, assume an individual with a catering business
whose van is destroyed in an accident and whose insurer
breaches his physical-damage policy in bad faith. If the caterer
is unable to cater an affair due to the insurer's breach-
assuming, of course, mitigation of damages by the insured was
unreasonable-the insurer should be held liable for the caterer's
lost profits as foreseeable consequential damages. If, however,
the caterer is unable to acquire additional culinary equipment
that he intended to purchase with the profits he expected to earn
on the cancelled affair, and he thus consequently must cancel a
future catering job for lack of the necessary equipment, the
insurer should not be held liable for the lost profits relating to
the subsequent job. The damages in the latter case are too
remote to have been foreseeable by the insurer, absent special
circumstances and communications that indicate the contrary.
Two of the jurisdictions cited by the Acquista court as
having adopted the contract rationale for bad faith insurance
breaches-New Jersey and Maine-have not adhered strictly to
Hadley v. Baxendale principles. In Pickett v. Lloyd's,63 the New
Jersey Supreme Court allowed the recovery of consequential
damages for an insurance company's bad faith breach of a
physical-damage policy on a Mack tractor-trailer truck.64 The
plaintiff owned the truck, which he used to haul freight for a
carrier.65 Because he had attained seniority, the plaintiff had
the ability to choose among the more lucrative and desirable
assignments. 66 In the event of an accident, the carrier permitted
senior "owner/operators" a sixty-day grace period in which to
replace their trucks and return to work and thereby avoid losing
their seniority status. 67 The plaintiff, however, lost his seniority
due to the fact that his claim was not settled within this grace
period and, as a result, he suffered reduced earnings.68
Although the insurer was aware that the plaintiff could not
63 621 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993).
64 See id. at 447.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id at 449.
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work until he repaired his truck,69 it was not aware of the
plaintiffs seniority status or of the benefits the plaintiff received
due to seniority, nor was it aware that a grace period existed
after which the plaintiff would lose seniority and its related
benefits. 70  The court sustained the consequential damages
award, which included both the plaintiffs lost profits and the
difference between what the plaintiff would have earned as a
senior operator over four and a half years (the time remaining
until he reached retirement age) and what he would have earned
working for the lower pay as a non-senior operator. 71 The court
then held that it was sufficient that the insurer knew that
plaintiff was out of work,72 concluding that the insurer "could
reasonably have apprehended that a truck driver in this
situation might lose an economic advantage such as his seniority
entitlement."73 The court also dismissed, without discussion, the
fact that the plaintiff had not considered leasing a truck, which
would have allowed him to retain his seniority, although he did
attempt to obtain a bank loan for the purpose of purchasing a
new truck.74
The Pickett court, in adopting the consequential damages
remedy in bad faith breach of insurance policies cases, should
have applied Hadley v. Baxendale principles more narrowly.
Even if the insurer had been on notice at the time of contracting
that the plaintiff would suffer loss of income if the truck were
damaged, it was not on notice that the plaintiff was subject to
loss of seniority. Assuming, arguendo, that the insurer should
have foreseen plaintiffs loss of earnings during the period in
which the truck remained damaged, it could not have foreseen
being held liable for plaintiffs loss of earnings in the years
subsequent to the repair of the truck and until the plaintiff
reached retirement age. Because the court determined that loss
of earnings, in general, was foreseeable by the defendant, it
concluded that all lost earnings were foreseeable.
When applying the foreseeability limitation to bad faith
claims, the courts must look to whether the particular loss
69 Id. at 448, 457.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 457.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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claimed was foreseeable, not to whether loss in general was
possible. Limiting damages to foreseeable particular losses is
important in order to prevent subjecting insurers to damages
that are excessively disproportionate to the risks and benefits of
the contract.7 5 A party to a contract will evaluate the benefits
and risks involved and will fix the consideration
commensurately. If a breaching party were held to damages it
could not have reasonably contemplated, the aggrieved party
would receive the retroactive benefit of having entered into a
contract for consideration that was less in value than that which
the breaching party would have demanded in return for being
exposed to that greater risk.76 In other words, the aggrieved
party subjects the breaching party to a greater risk without
paying fair consideration. If the breaching party had been aware
of the risk, it would have demanded greater consideration, which
would have offset the expense of paying the damages awarded to
the plaintiff. In the alternative, such a breaching party might
not have entered into the contract.
If the Pickett defendant had been aware that it could have
been held liable for the plaintiffs loss of earnings until
retirement age, it undoubtedly would have charged higher
premiums. If insurance companies believe that they will be held
liable for unforeseen damages, they may raise premiums on all
policies. Considering the fact that most people are affected by or
rely on insurance to some extent, deleterious consequences to
society could result if insurers are confronted with uncertainty in
their dealings with individuals and business entities. The
Pickett court should not have given such broad effect to the
foreseeability concept, and New York should not adopt a similar
approach. This Comment asserts that a foreseeability standard
that requires greater particularity would strike the necessary
75 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.14 at 821-22 ("The development of
[the unforeseeabilityl limitation was encouraged by a realization that liability for
unforeseeable loss might impose upon an entrepreneur a burden greatly out of
proportion to the risk that the entrepreneur originally supposed was involved and to
the corresponding benefit that the entrepreneur stood to gain.").
76 See M. N. Kniffin, A Newly Identified Contract Unconscionability:
Unconscionability of Remedy, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 260 (1988) ("[Ihf the
breaching party had known of such liability, it surely would have demanded more
consideration at the time of entering into the contract."). Furthermore, "there are
certain risks so unfair to a promisor, because of disproportion to the consideration
received, that he would have refused to enter into the contract had he been aware
that the law of damages would impose that risk upon him." Id. at 255.
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balance between the rights of the insurer and insured.
Additionally, the Pickett court was not disturbed by the fact
that the plaintiff did not attempt to lease a substitute truck. If
he had leased a truck, he would not have lost his seniority, and
the defendant would have only been liable for the cost of the
lease. It is generally agreed that a breaching party is not liable
for damages that could have been avoided by the injured party.77
The plaintiff in this case could have avoided losing his seniority.
The insurer, therefore, should not have been liable for damages
relating to this loss. This Comment is not intended to diminish
the hardship suffered by policyholders who are injured by their
insurer's bad faith breach, nor does this Comment assert that
insurance companies are deserving of preferential treatment
over policyholders. Rather, it is submitted that both insurers
and insureds should be treated fairly, and fairness dictates that
courts refrain from allowing their sympathies to color their
application of law to facts by applying unfairly broad standards
of foreseeability.
Another example of a court that incorrectly applied a
foreseeability standard and, therefore, failed to adhere to Hadley
v. Baxendale principles in the bad faith context is County Forest
Products, Inc. v. Green Mountain Agency, Inc. 78 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine in that case upheld a consequential
damages award to a sawmill that claimed, inter alia, that it was
forced to auction off undamaged equipment to pay its creditors,
due to the insurer's failure to settle in good faith a dispute
regarding a fire insurance policy.79 The court stated that even
though consequential damages may not have been foreseeable at
the time of contracting, they were foreseeable after the claim
arose.80 This reasoning directly contradicts the principle that
77 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.8 at 786 ("One [limitation on the
recovery of expectancy damages] is that the injured party cannot recover damages
for loss that could have been avoided if that party had taken appropriate steps to do
SO.").
78 758 A.2d 59 (Me. 2000).
79 See id. at 61-65.
80 The court stated:
With regard to the foreseeability of the consequential damages, it is
possible that the consequential damages were not foreseeable at the time
Green Mountain failed to procure the increased coverage, but they were
foreseeable and readily capable of identification after the fire and during
the time Green Mountain persisted in its actions of obfuscation and delay.
The court [below] did not err in concluding that Green Mountain was
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consequential damages must be foreseeable at the time the
parties entered into the contract.8' Consequential damages are
appropriate, and in fact necessary, in the bad faith context, but
adherence to well-settled contract principles must be
maintained.
It is important to emphasize that, under Acquista, insurance
companies will be subject to adverse judgments for consequential
damages only if they breach a policy in bad faith. New York
must take care to adopt a bad faith standard that will not affect
insurers who breach "honestly." 2 The Acquista court would find
bad faith "where an insured demonstrates more than merely a
denial of benefits promised under a policy of
insurance,... [where] the insurer's denial of the claim was
deliberately made in bad faith, [and] with knowledge of the lack
of a reasonable basis for the denial."8 3 This articulation of the
bad faith standard is too vague to prove useful. The majority, in
effect, stated that bad faith will be found when an insurance
company deals in bad faith, without defining or describing the
parameters of bad faith. Courts and juries need a more specific,
objective standard when they review facts to indicate bad faith
dealing. The majority's loose description allows for too subjective
of an examination on the part of the fact finder, which could lead
to inconsistent decisions. Without uniform decisions, insurance
companies will be unable to determine whether they are acting
in good faith when dealing with policyholders, and plaintiffs will
be encouraged to litigate unfounded claims if they are lead to
believe that a finding of bad faith is solely within a sympathetic
jury's discretion.
In his Acquista dissent, Justice Andrias suggested that the
court essentially adopt the bad faith standard described in Beck
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,8 4 the Utah Supreme Court case
on which the court based its holding.8 5 The Beck court stated
that if an insurer wished to satisfy its obligation of good faith
jointly and severally liable for the consequential damages with the
insurers.
Id. at 72.
81 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
82 See Capozzola, supra note 4, at 182 (stating that "in some states, an honest
mistake will expose an insurer to Bad Faith damages").
83 Acquista v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d 272, 277 (1st Dep't. 2001).
84 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
85 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 282 (Andrias, J., dissenting).
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dealing, it must "diligently investigate the facts to enable it to
determine whether a claim is valid, ... fairly evaluate the claim,
and... thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or
settling the claim." 6 The insurer must also " 'deal with laymen
as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law and
underwriting' and refrain from actions that will injure the
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract."87 The
Beck or some similar standard should be adopted and fully
articulated by the New York courts. This Comment asserts that
a several-pronged approach, such as the one advocated by the
Utah court in Beck, will protect insurance companies (and the
courts) from frivolous claims. Insurance companies will have a
standard against which to measure their own actions. If they
conform to each of the prongs, they can expect to be protected
against bad faith claims. Plaintiffs, too, will be better able to
judge whether their claims have merit. If plaintiffs are
presented with a more precise standard, they will be less likely
to bring frivolous suits. If they cannot allege facts that show a
violation of at least one of the prongs of the bad faith test, they
will be hard-pressed to sue.
Having a clearly articulated standard will also address the
dissent's concern that a bad faith claim could be "based solely
upon an insurer's failure to respond to a time-limited settlement
offer"-that insurers would be forced to adhere to a plaintiffs
timetable.88 The dissent cites Pavia v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.8 9 for the proposition that New York
has rejected the idea that bad faith could be proved solely on the
basis of an insurer's delay in settling.90 The dissent's reliance on
Pavia, however, is misplaced in that the claim at issue in Pavia
was a third-party insurance claim since the policyholder was
being sued and the insurance company was defending the
policyholder, whereas the claim asserted in Acquista was a first-
party claim since the policyholder sued the insurance company
directly to recover compensation owed directly to the
policyholder.91 Because the relationship between insurer and
86 Beck, 701 P.2d at 801.
87 Id.
88 Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 281 (Andrias, J., dissenting).
89 626 N.E.2d 24 (N.Y. 1993).
90 See Acquista, 730 N.Y.S.2d at 281-82 (Andrias, J., dissenting).
91 "Third party claims occur When the insured harms a person who is not a
party to the insurance contract. When the harmed person makes a claim against the
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insured in the third-party context is fiduciary, 92 and the
relationship between these parties in the first-party context is
essentially contractual, 93 some courts and commentators have
declined to employ a third-party analysis to a first-party
situation.94 Therefore, it is submitted that Pavia does not govern
the bad faith contract claim in Acquista.
In any event, adoption of the Beck standard would address
and dispel the dissent's valid concerns. The test under Beck is
whether the insurer acted "promptly and reasonably in rejecting
or settling the claim" after an investigation of the facts and
evaluation of the claim.95 It is submitted that, because this
would be a question of fact to be determined by the factfinder, a
plaintiffs demand for payment within a certain period of time
would be irrelevant. An insurer would still be afforded time to
investigate and evaluate a claim; however, it could not use such
an investigation and evaluation as a pretext for avoiding
settlement of a claim. This Comment asserts, therefore, that a
test for bad faith similar to the one adopted by the Beck court
would prevent plaintiffs who claim bad faith from dictating to
insurance companies a time frame in which the latter must
agree to settle.
II. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Traditionally, damages are not awarded for emotional
distress resulting from a breach of contract. 96 Some jurisdictions
insured the insurance company assumes responsibility for the defense and the
settlement." Capozzola, supra note 4, at 184-85. By contrast, first-party claims
"occur when the person insured on a policy-usually the policyholder-suffers an
injury and seeks compensation directly from the insurance company." Id.
92 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985); see also
Capozzola, supra note 4, at 186.
93 See Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-800.
94 See id. at 800 ("[I]t is difficult to find a theoretically sound basis for
analogizing the duty owed in a third-party context to that owed in a first-party
context."); see also Capozzola, supra note 4, at 191 (stating that "some courts
continue to assert that the rationale behind Third-Party Bad Faith simply does not
apply to First-Party Bad Faith"). But see Capozzola, supra note 4, at 193 ("The
contention that the fiduciary duty present in the third-party relationship is lacking
in first-party insurance policies misses the issue.... Bad Faith does not arise from
a breach of contract [, but] stems from an obligation, implied by law, to act in the
best interests of the insured.").
95 Beck, 701 P.2d at 801.
9r See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.17; see also CALAMARI & PERILLO,
supra note 1, at §14.5(b).
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have carved out exceptions to this rule by allowing recovery for
emotional distress if the breach was one likely to cause such
distress, including, for example, eviction of guests from hotels,
breaches of contracts for funeral arrangements, and breaches
that caused physical injury.97 The rule in New York is that a
plaintiff cannot recover damages for emotional distress for
breach of a contract "absent a duty upon which liability can be
based."98 New York, however, has allowed damage awards to
compensate for emotional distress in contract situations where a
public interest was perceived to exist, such as for expulsion from
a bathhouse, 99 for insults cast by a railway conductor'00 and by
an innkeeper's servant,10 1 and for failure to maintain a
gravesite. 10 2 But New York courts have consistently denied
recovery for emotional distress caused by breaches of insurance
policies such as policies for medical insurance, 10 3 no-fault motor
insurance,10 4 and fire insurance. 0 5
The Acquista court would allow a plaintiff to recover
damages for emotional distress if such loss "were a foreseeable
result of a [first-party bad faith] breach at the time the policy
was entered into."106 The court would seem to allow damages for
emotional distress in all cases where a plaintiff could prove that
such loss was foreseeable at the time of contracting. It is
submitted that the court's holding is too broad. Allowing
recovery for emotional distress would effect a significant change
in New York law, and, therefore, this Comment asserts that the
award of such damages must be limited to plaintiffs who have
suffered some type of physical injury, medical disability, or who
would benefit from a policy relating to matters likely to cause
emotional distress, such as life insurance.
There are two reasons to allow recovery for emotional
97 See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973); see also Yochim v.
Mt. Hope Cemetery Ass'n. 623 N.Y.S.2d 80 (City Ct. 1994); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 1, at § 12.17; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 1, at §14.5(b).
98 Wehringer v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 440 N.E.2d 1331, 1332 (N.Y.
1982).
99 See Aaron v. Ward, 96 N.E. 736 (N.Y. 1911).
100 See Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 70 N.E. 857 (N.Y. 1904).
101 See de Wolf v. Ford, 86 N.E. 527 (N.Y. 1908).
102 See Yochim, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
103 See Wehringer, 440 N.E.2d at 1331.
104 See Hess v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d 701 (3d Dep't. 2000).
105 See Sweazey v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 571 N.Y.S.2d 131 (3d Dep't. 1991).
106 Acquista v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 730 N.Y.S.2d 272, 277-78 (1st Dep't. 2001).
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distress in a bad faith case: (1) courts must provide an incentive
to insurance companies to deal with insureds in good faith and
(2) emotional distress is a foreseeable result of a breach of
certain policies. As stated above, without the possibility of being
subject to judgments in excess of the policy, insurance companies
could find it financially beneficial to avoid settling claims in good
faith.10 7  Also, under the standard of foreseeability with
particularity herein proposed, emotional distress may be the
only form of consequential damages recoverable by a plaintiff. 08
The threat of being subject to damages for emotional distress,
therefore, would provide a significant incentive to insurance
companies to perform their obligations in good faith.
Additionally, because insurance bad faith breaches have become
widespread, 10 9 and society relies on insurance to a great extent,
it is submitted that a public interest does exist in these
situations, rendering the award of damages for emotional
distress appropriate.
Emotional distress is a highly foreseeable consequence of an
insurance company's bad faith breach of a policy. The
paramount purpose for the purchase of insurance is to obtain
security, both financially and emotionally. 110  Insurers also
recognize this dual purpose of insurance by advertising their
policies as providing "peace of mind.""' It is submitted,
therefore, that given the fact that emotional distress will occur if
107 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text. A further explanation of this
concept will follow.
109 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
110 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah 1985) ("[Ilt is
axiomatic that insurance frequently is purchased not only to provide funds in case
of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the insured or his beneficiaries."); see also
Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 69 (Mich. 1980) ("[Ilt is elemental
that an insured is basically contracting for both financial and emotional security in
the event of loss.").
111 For example, on its website, New York Life characterizes its disability
insurance (the kind of insurance Acquista purchased) as follows: "Disability
insurance can provide peace of mind and removes the uncertainty in case of an
accident or sickness that makes someone incapable of working." At
http://www.newyorklife.com/NYL2/CategoryDisplay/0,1233,10602,00.html (last
visited May 19, 2002). Aetna Life Insurance described its own long-term disability
insurance as follows: "Aetna long term care insurance can help [with the costs
related to a policyholder's disability]. And along the way it will give you precious
peace of mind, when you may need it most." At
http://www.aetnaushc.com/groupinsurance/membersset.htm (last visited May 19,
2002).
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the policyholder does not have sufficient funds at the time of the
loss, this fact is within the contemplation of both parties at the
time the contract was formed. Indeed, the insurance companies
propose and stress the point in their own materials. 112 Insofar as
emotional distress is foreseeable within the meaning of Hadley v.
Baxendale principles, recovery for loss due to its occurrence
should be allowed as consequential damages, but only in limited
contexts.
This Comment acknowledges that awarding damages for
emotional distress for a bad faith breach of an insurance policy
would produce a significant change in the law of New York. It is
submitted, therefore, that, just as consequential damages in
general should be limited, 113 so should limits be imposed on the
award of damages for emotional distress. As courts have done in
other jurisdictions, New York should look to the "nature of the
breach" when deciding when to grant such damages. 114 It is
submitted that a bad faith claim for emotional distress should be
permitted only where the insured suffers physical pain or serious
medical illness, such as the kind accompanying situations
covered by medical and disability insurance or where the insured
suffers an injury in an automobile accident or fire, or when the
contract deals with an emotional subject likely to cause distress,
such as policies for life insurance or for a cemetery plot. This
approach would avoid effecting too great a change in New York
law. It would provide protection to policyholders, while at the
same time limiting in a reasonable manner, the amount of
claims under which insurance companies could be held liable for
emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
The cases and commentaries proclaim the necessity of
providing protection to policyholders from first-party bad faith
breaches by their insurers. The possibility of awards for
consequential damages, including damages for emotional
distress, in excess of the amount of the policy is a practical and
effective approach to this problem. Insurance companies,
however, must be safeguarded from the burdens of having to pay
112 See supra note 112.
113 See supra notes 59-96 and accompanying text.
114 FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.17.
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disproportionate damages and from frivolous suits.
Consequential damages, therefore, must be granted pursuant to
strict adherence to Hadley v. Baxendale principles. Allowing
damages only for losses that were foreseeable with particularity
by the parties at the time of contracting would ensure that these
principles are followed. New York must also adopt a clear
standard articulating the elements of a bad faith breach. For
example, bad faith could be found if: (1) the insurer did not
diligently investigate the facts to determine whether the claim
was valid; (2) the insurer did not fairly evaluate the claim; or (3)
the insurer did not act promptly and reasonably in settling or
rejecting the claim.115 Finally, awards for emotional distress
should only be granted in cases where the plaintiff suffers from a
physical injury or from a medical ailment, or the policy relates to
a subject that is likely to cause emotional distress, such as life
insurance. This Comment asserts that the expanded contract
remedy, together with the judicial limitations set forth above,
would provide adequate protection to insurance companies and
would, at the same time, encourage them to deal with their
policyholders in good faith.
115 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
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